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IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


I.I 


125 


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lit 

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2.0 


HI 


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1'-''  lllli^  i^ 

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Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


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23  WKT  MAIN  STiHT 

WIUTIR.N.Y.  MSIO 

(716)  t72'4S03 


^^^>/^ 

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4 


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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/iCIVIH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  instituta  for  Historical  Microraproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  da  microraproductions  hiatoriquaa 


Tcehnieal  and  Bibliographic  Notaa/Notaa  tacliniquaa  at  bibiiographiquaa 


Th«c< 
totlw 


Th«  Inttituta  haa  anamptad  to  obtain  tha  boat 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Faaturaa  of  tliia 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographieally  uniqua. 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagaa  in  tha 
raproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  changa 
tha  usual  mathod  of  filming,  ara  chaclcad  bolow. 


□   Coiourad  covara/ 
Couvarturo  da  coulour 


r~~|   Covars  damagad/ 


Couvartura  andommagia 


□   Covars  rastorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Couvartura  raataurAo  at/ou  poiliculAa 


D 


D 
D 

n 


D 


Covar  titia  miaaing/ 

La  titra  da  couvartura  manqua 


r~~|   Coiourad  mapa/ 


D 


Cartaa  gtegraphiquaa  it  coulotir 


Coiourad  inic  (i.a.  othar  than  blua  cr  blacic)/ 
Encra  da  coulaur  (i.a.  autra  qua  blaua  ou  noira) 


Coiourad  plataa  and/or  illuatrationa/ 
Planchaa  at/ou  illuatrationa  an  coulaur 

Bound  with  othar  matarial/ 
Rali4  avac  d'autraa  documants 


Tight  binding  may  cauaa  shadows  or  distortion 
along  intarior  margin/ 

La  r%  llura  sarria  paut  eausar  da  I'ombra  ou  da  la 
diatoraion  l«  long  do  la  margo  IntAriaura 

Blanit  laavaa  addad  during  rastoration  may 
appaar  within  tha  taxt.  Whanavar  possibia,  thasa 
hava  baan  omittad  from  filming/ 
II  so  paut  qua  cartainaa  pagaa  bianchaa  ajout^aa 
lors  d'una  rastauration  apparaiaaant  dana  la  taxta. 
maia,  lorsqua  eala  Atait  possibia.  eas  pagas  n'ont 
pas  4t«  fllm4aa. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commantairas  supplimantairas; 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  la  maillaur  axamplairo 
qu1l  lui  a  4tA  possibia  da  sa  procurer.  Las  details 
da  cat  axamplairo  qui  sont  paut-4tra  uniquas  du 
point  da  vua  bibliographiqua.  qui  pauvant  modifiar 
una  imaga  raproduita.  ou  qui  pauvant  oxigar  una 
modification  dana  la  mAthoda  normals  da  fllmage 
sont  indiquis  ci-dassous. 


nn  Coiourad  pagas/ 


D 


Pagoa  do  coulaur 

Pagaa  damagad/ 
Pagoa  andommagtes 

Pagas  raatored  and/oi 

Pagas  rastaurias  at/ou  polliculias 

Pagas  discolourad.  stainad  or  foxai 
Pagas  dAcolorias.  tachatias  ou  piquias 

Pagaa  datachad/ 
Pagas  ditachias 

Showthroughy 
Transparanca 

Quality  of  prin 

Qualiti  inigala  da  I'imprassion 

Inciudas  supplamantary  matarii 
Comprand  du  matAriai  suppl4mantaira 

Only  adition  availabia/ 
Saula  Mition  disponibia 


□   Pagaa  damagad/ 
Pagoa 

r~n   Pagas  raatorad  and/or  laminatad/ 

0   Pagas  discolourad.  stainad  or  foxad/ 
Pagas 

r~n  Pagaa  datachad/ 

[^  Showthrough/ 

rn  Quality  of  print  varias/ 

r~1  Inciudas  supplamantary  material/ 

rn  Only  adition  availabia/ 


Tha  in 
posall 
of  the 
filmin 


Origin 
bagini 
tha  iai 
aion,  I 
othar 
first  p 
sion,  I 
or  illu 


Thaii 
shall  I 
TINUI 
whicti 

Mapa, 

diffar( 

antira 

bagin 

right 

raquii 

math( 


Pagas  wholly  or  partially  obscursd  by  strata 
slips,  tissues,  etc..  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Lee  pages  totalement  ou  pertieilement 
obscurcies  par  un  f<?iiillet  d'erreta.  una  pelure, 
etc..  ont  At*  filmAes  A  nouveau  da  fafon  i 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  eheelced  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film*  au  taux  da  reduction  indiqu*  ei-dessous. 


10X 

14X 

18X 

22X 

26X 

30X 

y 

12X 


1IX 


aox 


24X 


2BX 


32X 


d«tailt 
u«s  du 
E  modifier 
gar  una 
)  filmage 


Tha  copy  f  ilmad  hara  haa  baan  raproducad  thanka 
to  tha  ganaroaity  of: 

Douglaa  Library 
Quaan'a  Univaraity 

Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poaaibia  eonaidaring  tha  condition  and  iagibility 
of  tha  originai  copy  and  in  icaaping  with  tha 
Aiming  contract  apacif  irationa. 


L'axampiaira  fiimA  f ut  raproduit  grica  A  la 
g^niroaitA  da: 

Douglaa  Library 
Quaan'a  Univaraity 

Laa  imagaa  auhrantaa  ont  At*  raprodultaa  avac  la 
piua  grand  aoin,  eompta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattat*  da  l'axampiaira  filmA,  at  an 
conformity  avac  laa  conditiona  du  contrat  da 
fllmaga. 


lias 


Originai  copiaa  in  printad  papar  covara  ara  filmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  or  iliuatratad  impraa- 
aion,  or  tha  bacic  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  copiaa  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  Iliuatratad  impraa- 
aion.  and  anding  on  tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad 
or  iliuatratad  impraaalon. 


Lm  axamplalraa  orlglnaux  dont  la  couvartura  an 
papiar  aat  ImprimAa  aont  fiimAs  an  commandant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  aoit  par  la 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampralnta 
d'impraaalon  ou  d'iiiuatration,  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  aaion  la  caa.  Toua  laa  autras  axamplalraa 
orlglnaux  aont  fiimAa  an  commandant  par  la 
pramMra  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampralnta 
d'impraaalon  ou  d'illuatration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  talla 
ampralnta. 


Tha  laat  racordad  frama  on  aach  microfiche 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  ^»>  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  symbol  Y  (moaning  "END"), 
whichavar  appllaa. 


Un  daa  aymboiaa  auivanta  apparattra  sur  la 
darnlAra  Imaga  da  chaqua  microflcha,  salon  la 
caa:  la  symbola  -^>  signifia  "A  SUiVRE",  la 
aymbola  ▼  algnlfia  "FIN". 


ira 


Mapa,  piataa,  charts,  ate,  may  ba  filmad  at 
diffarant  raduction  ratloa.  Thoaa  too  iarga  to  ba 
antiraiy  included  In  ona  axpoaura  ara  filmad 
baginning  In  tha  uppar  laft  hand  corner,  laft  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  aa  many  framaa  aa 
required.  The  following  diagrama  illustrate  the 
method: 


l.ea  cartas,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
f limAa  A  daa  taux  da  rAductlon  diff Arents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  aaul  clichA.  II  eat  fllmA  A  partir 
da  I'angia  aupAriaur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  an  iMa,  an  prenant  la  nombre 
d'imagea  nAcaaaaira.  Laa  diagrammea  auivanta 
iliuatrent  la  mAthoda. 


)y  errata 
ad  to 

int 

mo  paluro, 

■con  A 


32X 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

8 

6 

I 


1 


VII 


I 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  i  8  i  2 


UPON  THE 


Consolidation  of  tlie  Union 


:  n 


T 


JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY  STUDIES 


IN 


Historical  and  Political    Science 


HERBERT  B.  ADAMS,  Editor 


History  la  past  Politics  and  Politics  present  History— JVeeman 


FIFTH  SERIES 


VII 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1 8 1 2 


UPON  THE 


CONSOLIDATION  OF  THE  UNION 


Bv  NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER,  Ph.  D. 

IkUor  in  Philosophy  in  Columbia  College 
President  of  the  InduilrUU  Education  Asiociation's  College  /or  the  li-aining  (if  Teacheri 


BALTIMORE 

PCBUCATtON  AOBNCT  OF  THE  JOUMS  HOFKIMS  UNIVBRaiTT 

JULY,  1887 


COPTBIGHT,  1887,  BY  N.  MURRAT. 


I  t 


JOHN  MUBPHT  *  00.,  PRIMTXBS 
BALTWOBB. 


! 


THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812 


UPON  THE 


CONSOLIDATION  OF  THE  UNION. 


The  two  great  motive  forces  in  American  politics  during  the 
first  century  of  the  national  existence  were  the  questions  of  state 
sovereignty  and  of  slavery.  The  pressure  of  the  first  was  al  most 
wholly,  yet  but  temporarily,  relieved  by  the  second  war  with 
Great  Britain,  and  it  was  reserved  for  the  great  civil  war  of 
1861-0  to  put  an  effectual  quietus  upon  both. 

The  course  of  the  conflict  over  these  questions  shows  that 
until  the  war  of  1812  that  of  state  sovereignty,  pure  and  sim- 
ple, occupied  the  foremost  place  in  the  nation's  political  activity. 
From  the  conclusion  of  that  war  period  until  1861  the  question 
of  slavery,  with  all  its  far-reaching  collateral  issues,  asserted  its 
preeminence,  and  in  its  disastrous  overthrow  and  complete 
downfall  carried  the  state  sovereignty  heresy  with  it  to  a 
common  ruin. 

The  concrete  question  with  which  we  are  to  deal  at  present 
is  the  effect  of  the  war  of  1812  on  the  consolidation  of  the 
Union.  To  understand  this  intelligently  we  must  acquaint 
ourselves  with  the  positions  taken  in  rieference  to  the  state- 
sovereignty  dispute  down  to  the  time  when  war  was  declared, 
and  with  the  condition  of  the  Union  at  that  time  in  respect  to 
real  unity.  We  must  examine  the  political  character  and 
motives  of  the  war  itself,  and  discover  the  status  of  the 

6 


6 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  upon  the         [252 


li  • 


national  unity  in  the  years  immediately  succeeding  the  war. 
When  all  this  is  done  we  shall  be  entitled  to  pronounce  upon 
the  effect  of  the  war  of  1812  on  the  consolidation  of  the 
Union. 

It  is  probable  that  in  the  light  of  historical  fact,  and  the 
full  discussion  which  the  question  has  since  received,  culmi- 
nating in  the  irrevocable  verdict  of  a  terrible  civil  war,  no  one 
will  care  to  deny  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence  of  July 
4th,  1776,  was  the  act  of  an  ethnographically  and  geograph- 
ically unified  nation,  and  not  the  separate  though  synchronous 
deed  of  thirteen  constituent  parts  of  that  nation.  Moreover, 
the  authority  of  the  Continental  Congreas  as  a  revolutionary 
body  cannot  be  questioned.  It  was  this  Congress  that  drew  up 
and  adopted  the  Articles  of  Confederation  of  1781.  But  even 
at  the  time  of  the  original  adoption  of  these  Articles  by  Con- 
gress, November  14th,  1777,  the  enthusiasm  of  1776  was 
abated ;  the  national  ardor  had  cooled  and  had  been  superseded 
by  more  particularistic  and  selfish  feelings.  Thus  the  infant 
nation  of  1776,  even  before  it  had  risen  from  its  cradle,  seemed 
sickening  to  its  death. 

"  The  preponderance  of  the  anti-national  tendencies  during 
the  early  life  of  the  Union  undoubtedly  had  its  origin  in  the 
political  and  social  development  of  the  states,  in  their  want 
of  political  connection  before  the  Revolution,  in  the  little 
intercourse,  commercial  and  other,  between  them,  and  lastly 
in  various  differences  in  their  natural  situation  which  rendered 
a  rapid  intergrowth  of  the  several  States  impossible  and  the 
collisions  attendant  thereon  unavoidable."  ^ 

When  the  time  came  to  form  a  national  government  it  was 
but  natural  that  two  opposing  views  should  be  taken  as  to 
the  extent  of  the  powers  to  be  conferred  upon  that  government. 

To  begin  with,  the  very  nature  of  the  question  provoked, 
if  it  did  not  require,  the  formation  of  two  opposing  parties ; 


'  Von  Hoist,  The  Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United  States, 
Chicago,  1877,  Vol.  I.  pp.  106,  107. 


\ 


[252 


B  war. 
3  upon 
of  the 


nd  the 
culmi- 
no  one 
)f  July 
(graph- 
ironous 
►reover, 
itionary 
Irew  up 
ut  even 
)y  Con- 
76  was 
)erseded 
e  infant 
,  seemed 

5  during 
n  in  the 
sir  want 
le  little 
lastly 
'endered 
and  the 

[t  it  was 
en  as  to 
jrnment. 
rovoked, 
parties ; 

[ted  States, 


253] 


OonadidoHon  of  the  Union, 


then,  the  selfish  feelings  of  a  particular  state  or  states,  loth 
to  give  up  natural  advantages  to  the  common  weal,  would 
oppose  a  strong  central  government,  and  in  any  such  move- 
ment as  the  American  Revolution,  an  ultra-democratic  party, 
lai^e  or  small  as  the  case  may  be,  is  sure  to  develop.  But  in 
this  case  fact  proved  more  powerful  than  theory.  The  stern 
necessities  of  the  case  and  the  ably-defended  opinions  of  Ham- 
ilton, Madison,  and  their  coadjutors,  in  spite  of  the  technical 
provisions  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  carried  through 
the  proposition  for  the  Philadelphia  Convention  of  1787,  and 
in  it  sounder  political  science  prevailed.  As  a  result  our 
present  Constitution  was  promulgated. 

The  great  Constitutional  Party,  as  we  may  appropriately 
describe  the  Federalists,  immediately  after  the  organization 
of  the  government  under  the  instrument  of  1787,  put  forth 
by  word  and  deed  a  theory  of  government  deduced  from 
their  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  which  in  reality  they 
had  framed.     The  occasion  of  the  crystallization  of  the  ele- 
ments of  this  party  into  an  unified  whole  was  the  struggle  for 
the  adoption  and  adjustment  of  the  system  of  1787.     Their 
theory  was,  in  brief,  that  the  government  was  based  on  a 
national  popular  sovereignty,  that  the  central  government 
should  be  independent  in  all  its  machinery  of  the  local  gov- 
ernments, exercising  all  general  powers  and  interpreting  by 
its  own  constituted  agents  what  was  local  and  what  was  gen- 
eral, under  such  limitations  as  were  put  upon  it  in  the  Con- 
stitution itself  by  the  national  popular  sovereignty.     But  in 
the  struggle  this  party  was  obliged  to  give  up,  if  indeed  it 
ever  distinctly  held,  a  wholly  national  doctrine  and  ground 
itself  for  the  purpose  of  victory  on  a  federal  system,  midway 
between  confederation  and  nationalism,  though  strongly  lean- 
ing toward  the  latter.    This  federal  system,  though  still  hold- 
ing to  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  as 
ultimate,  yet  admitted  that  a  system  of  local  commonwealth 
governments  was  fundamental  in  our  political  system.     In 
other  words,  it  allowed  that  the  Union  was  one  of  states,  but 
not  of  state  governments. 


I 


I 


i 


I  The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  ujxm  the         [264 

The  original  opponents  of  this  doctrine  cannot  be  dignified 
with  the  name  party.  Their  nucleus  was  a  few  extremists  of 
the  Kousseau  stamp,  who  believed  or  pretended  to  believe  that 
the  state  of  nature  was  the  only  perfect  state  and  that  all 
society  had  originated  in  a  social  compact ;  that  government, 
which  is  in  its  very  nature  tyrannical  and  oppressive,  had 
grown  up  from  an  exaggemtion  of  powers  originally  relin- 
quished by  the  individual  in  the  compact.  Around  such  men 
and  opinions  as  these  the  opposition  to  Federalism  began  to 
collect.  It  acquired  strength  and  definiteness  by  the  debates 
on  the  Funding^  and  Assumption^  bills,  the  Slavery  Peti- 
tion' debate  of  1790,  the  Excise  Tax,*  the  National  Bank 
bill,*  and  from  the  complications  in  foreign  affairs  in  which 
the  administration  became  involved.  In  addition  "the  French 
Revolution  introduced  from  abroad  an  element  which,  inde- 
pendent of  the  actual  condition  of  affairs  and  partly  in  conflict 
with  it,  kept  excitement  at  the  boiling  point  during  many 
years.'  The  French  Revolution  was  at  first  hailed  with  delight 
by  all  parties  in  the  United  States ;  when,  however,  after  the 
death  of  Mirabeau,  the  impossibility  of  control  and  the  mis- 
takes of  the  helpless  court  transferred  the  preponderance  of 
power  to  the  radicals  and  when  the  anarchical  elements  daily 
grew  bolder,  the  Federalists  began  to  turn  away.    The  anti- 


'  Von  Hoist,  1. 85, 86.  Hildreth,  History  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
New  York,  Harper  and  Brothers,  1851, Vol.  IV.  152-171,  213-220.  This  and 
most  of  the  following  references  to  Hildreth  are  given  to  show  where  fuller 
information  on  the  subjects  referred  to  may  be  found. 

•Hildreth,  IV.  171-174,  213-220. 

'  Von  Hoist,  I.  89-93;  Hildreth,  IV.  174-204.  In  this  debate  the  threat 
of  civil  war  was  uttered  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Representatives  for 
perhaps  the  first  time.  The  speaker  was  Tucker  of  South  Carolina,  and  his 
words  were :  "  Do  these  men  expect  a  general  emancipation  by  law  ?  This 
would  never  be  submitted  to  by  the  Southern  States  without  a  civil  war." 
See  Benton,  Abridgment  of  the  Debates  of  Congress,  I.  208. 

*  Von  Hoist,  I.  94,  95;  Hildretli,  IV.  253-256. 

»  Von  Hoist,  I.  104-106;  Hildreth,  IV.  256-267. 

•Hildreth,  IV.  411-413. 


ill! 


il  I 


[254 

dignified 
emiste  of 
lieve  that 
i  that  all 
rernment, 
sive,  had 
lly  relin- 
such  men 
I  began  to 
le  debates 
rery  Peti- 
)nal  Bank 
i  in  which 
the  French 
hich,  inde- 
in  conflict 
ping  many 
rith  delight 
r,  after  the 
d  the  mis- 
ideranoe  of 
lents  daily 
The  anti- 


of  America. 

;20.   This  and 

where  fuller 


ate  the  threat 
laentatives  for 
olina,  and  his 
>ylaw?  This 
a  civil  war." 


255] 


Qmaoiidation  of  the  Union. 


9 


Federalists  on  the  other  hand  clung  more  dearly  to  it  than 
ever.  The  farther  France  proceeded,  by  the  adoption  of  brutal 
measures,  in  the  direction  of  political  idealism,  the  more  rank 
was  the  growth  in  the  United  States  of  the  most  radical  doo- 
trinarianism ;  the  more  attentively  the  legislators  of  France 
listened  to  Danton's  voice  of  thunder  and  Marat's  fierce  cry 
for  blood,  the  more  boldly  did  demagogism  in  its  most  repul- 
sive form  rage  in  the  United  States."  ^ 

Many  of  the  objections  to  the  Federalist  measures  were 
closely  bordering  on  the  ridiculous,  while  but  a  few  were 
defensible.  "  But  no  reasoning  was  too  absurd  to  find  credu- 
lous hearers  when  the  rights  of  the  States  were  alleged  to  be 
in  danger  and  the  services  of  the  phantom  *  consolidation  * 
were  required.  The  politicians  would  not,  however,  in  a 
matter  of  such  importance  have  dared  to  wage  so  strong  a  war 
of  opposition  and  they  could  not  have  carried  it  on  for  ten 
years  and  have  finally  conquered,  if  they  had  not  had  as  a 
broad  and  firm  foundation  to  build  upon,  the  anti-national- 
istic tendencies  which  prevailed  among  the  people."  * 

The  word  anti-nationalistic  is  used  advisedly ;  for  by  it  is 
meant  that  among  the  people  there  was  a  strong  feeling  that 
any  dissatisfied  state  or  number  of  states  might  secede  or 
withdraw  at  pleasure  from  the  Union.  Nor  was  this  idea  by 
any  means  confined  to  the  anti-Federalists  or  to  that  section 
of  the  country  in  which  their  strength  mainly  lay.  It  is  also 
a  mistake  to  suppose  that  these  feelings  never  found  vent  in 
words  until  the  great  slavery  contest,  many  years  later.  In 
point  of  fact,  as  early  as  1793,  when  peace  with  England  was 
endangered  by  Genet's  machinations  and  their  consequences,* 
there  were  those  in  the  New  England  States  who  in  no  covert 
language  urged  that  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  was  preferable 
to  war  with  Great  Britain.    Here  are  the  words  of  Th.  Dwight, 


>  Von  Hoist,  1. 107. 
•  Von  Hoist,  1. 106. 
•Von  Hoist,  1. 112-118;  Hildreth,  IV.  412-440,  477,  478. 


I  1 


10 


The  Effect  of  the  War  o/  1812  upm  the         [256 


writing  at  this  time  to  Wolcott :  "A  Mar  with  Great  Britain, 
we,  at  Icjwt  in  New  Enghmd,  will  not  enter  into.  Sooner 
wouhl  ninety-nine  ont  of  one  hnndred  of  our  inhabitants  sep- 
arate from  the  Union  than  plnngc  thenist^lves  into  an  abyss  of 
misery." '  Heneii  it  is  evident  that  the  geographical  grotiping 
of  the  friends  and  enemies  of  the  Jay  treaty  '^  did  not  eseajje  them 
in  spite  of  appearances  whicli  were  at  first  deceptive.  Going 
beyond  the  limits  of  tlie  <piestion  innnediately  under  ccmsidera- 
tion  they  pointed  to  a  division  of  the  republic  into  two  great 
sections  and  dechireil  an  understanding  between  them  to  be  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  continuation  of  the  Union.  Wolcott 
writes  to  his  father  the  following,  August  10th,  1795:  "I  am, 
however,  almost discouragetl  witii  respect  to  the  southern  states; 
the  eflect  of  the  slave  system  has  been  such  that  I  fear  our 

govormnent  will  never  oj)erate  with  efKcaey Indeed 

we  nuist  of  necessity  soon  como  to  a  sober  explanation  with 
the  people  and  know  upon  what  we  are  to  depend."^ 

It  was  reserved  for  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws  of  1798* 
to  cjdl  forth  from  the  oj:position  their  first  definite  declaration 
of  political  principles.  This  is  containetl  in  th.e  Kentu(!ky  and 
\'irginia  Resolutions  and  in  the  supplements  thereto  passed 
on  receipt  of  the  i-eplies  from  other  State  liCgislatures.  lint 
wc  find  another  instance  of  definite  ♦^ulk  concerning  disruption 
before  these  resolutions  were  passed.  In  May  of  1798,  the 
idea  of  sc'j)aration  arose  in  the  South  as  a  means  of  es(!ape 
from  the  suprenuiey  of  Massachuscttj  and  Connecticut,  which 
had  to  the  Southern  States  become  unbearable.  John  Taylor 
of  Virgi!)ia,  by  no  means  an  imimportant  man,  said  "it  was 
not  unwise  now  to  estinuite  the  separate  mass  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina  with  a  view  to  their  sei)arate  existence."* 
Jofierson  wrote  him  in  relation  to  this  matter,  June  1st,  1798, 


•  (iibbs,  ^Icm.  of  Walcott,  I.  107.    Quoted  by  Voii  Hoist. 
"Von  llolst,  I.  rJ'.>-l-J8;  HlKlrotli,  IV.  488,  53y-ooG,  590-016. 
Hiibbs,  A[oni.  of  Waloott,  I.  '224. 

*  Von  Hol^t,  I.  14-2;  Jlililivtii,  V.  210,  225-228. 
"  Von  llolst,  I.  143. 


[256 

,t  Britain, 
.     Sooner 
tants  scp- 
11  abyH8  of 
grouping 
capi!  them 
0.     Going 
consitlera- 
two  great 
ni  to  1)0  a 
.    Wolcott 
5:  "I  am, 
icrn  states ; 
I  tear  our 
.     Indeed 
ation  with 

>3 

a  of  1798* 
leclaration 
itu(!ky  and 
•eto  passed 
iires.     But 
lisruptiou 
1798,  the 
of  esc!apc 
ut,  whieh 
in  Taylor 
id  "  it  was 
'  Virginia 
xisteiice."* 
1st,  1798, 


257] 


Consolidation  of  (lie  Union. 


11 


that  it  Mould  not  be  wise  to  proeced  immcth'ately  to  a  dis- 
ruption of  the  Union  when  party  passion  was  at  such  a 
lieight. ' 

The  Kentneky  Kesolutions*  of  November  10th,  1798,  and 
November  14th,  1799,  really  sounded  the  keynote  of  the 
Federalists'  opponents,  who  had  now  come  to  be  cjiIUkI  Re- 
publicans. In  brief  their  position  was  that  the  Constitution 
was  a  compact  to  which  the  states  were  integral  parties,  and 
that  each  party  had  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself  as  well 
of  infractions  of  that  compact  as  of  the  mode  and  measures 
of  redress;  and  that  the  rightful  renie<ly  against  the  oppres- 
sion of  the  central  government  or  the  exercise  by  it  of  any 
ungranted  powers,  was  the  nullification  of  any  obnoxious  act 
by  the  state  or  states  objecting  thereto.  This  was  distinct 
and  exact  as  far  as  it  went,  but  it  lefl  to  Calhoun  and  a  greater 
crisis  the  logical  pui'suaiuje  of  the  doctrines  to  their  farthest 
conclusions. 

If  the  claim  to  the  right  of  nullification  as  set  forth  in  1799 
was  well-grounded,  the  Constitution  was  indeed  different  from 
the  Articles  of  Confederation  in  particulars,  but  the  political 
character  of  the  Union  was  ess(;ntially  unchanged,  and  it  wsis 
now  as  before,  a  confederation  of  the  loosest  structure.  On 
this  very  point  the  comment  has  been  well  made :  "  to  the 
extent  that  practice  was  in  accord  with  theory  a  mere  me(.'liani- 
cal  motion  would  have  taken  the  place  of  organic  life.  Sooner 
or  later  even  that  would  have  ceased,  for  the  state  is  an  organ- 
ism, not  a  machine."'' 

AVashington  now,  December  25tli,  1798,  in  writing  to 
Lafayette,  declared  that  "  the  Constitution,  according  to  their 
[the  anti-Fed«.'ralists']  interpretation  of  it,  would  be  a  mere 
cipher."*    Three  weeks  later  he  wrote  to  Patrick  Henry: 


I 


IG. 


» Joflbrson,  WorkH,  IV.  245-248. 

•Von  Hoist,  I.  144-I.J5;  Ilildrcth,  V.  272-277,  296,  310-321. 

»Von  Hoist,  1.  151,  152. 

nViishington,  Works,  XI.  378. 


12 


I '  I 

I'M 


li 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  up<m  the         [258 


"Measures    are    systematically   and   pertinacioasly    pursued 
which  must  eventually  dissolve  the  Union  or  produce  coer- 


»i 


cion. 

Very  shortly  afterward  the  ultimate  consequences  of  the 
Kentucky  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  were  boldly 
drawn.*  Tucker,  whose  edition  of  Blackstone  appeared  in 
1803,  writes:  "The  Federal  government,  then,  appears  to 
be  the  organ  through  which  the  united  republics  communi- 
cate with  foreign  nations  and  with  each  other.  Their  sub- 
mission to  its  operation  is  voluntary ;  its  councils,  its  engage- 
ments, its  authority  are  theirs,  modified  and  united.  Its 
sovereignty  is  an  emanation  from  theirs,  not  a  flame  in  which 
they  have  been  consumed,  nor  a  vortex  in  which  they  have 
been  swallowed  up.  Each  is  still  a  perfect  state,  still  sover- 
eign, still  independent  and  still  capable,  should  the  occasion 
require,  to  resume  the  exercise  of  its  functions  in  the  most 
unlimited  extent."^  Surely  there  is  little  here  that  marks 
any  degree  of  consolidation.  This  makes  the  Constitution 
but  a  bond  of  straw  and  the  nation  to  be  no  nation ;  nothing 
but  a  mere  conglomeration  of  independent  commonwealths. 
And  when  we  recollect  that  this  view  M'as  that  of  a  large 
majority  of  the  people  at  that  time,  and  then  read  anew  the 
Constitution  and  its  exposition  as  given  by  its  framers,  we 
must  agree  with  John  Quincy  Adams  in  saying  that  "  the 
Constitution  itself  had  been  extorted  from  the  grinding  neces- 
sity of  a  reluctant  nation."  * 

The  hold  of  the  Federalists,  which  had  gradually  been 
growing  weaker,  was  effectually  loosenal  once  and  forever  by 
the  presidential  election  of  1800.     Up  to  that  time  that  party 


>  Washington,  Works,  XI.  389. 

•  Von  Hoist,  I.  161,  note. 

'Tucker's  Blackstone,  Philadelphia,  1803, 1.,  Part  1,  Appendix,  p.  187. 

*The  Jubilee  of  the  Constitution,  a  discourse  delivered  at  the  request  of 
the  New  York  Historical  Society  on  Tuesday,  the  30th  of  April,  1831),  being 
the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  inauguration  of  George  Washington  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  New  York,  1839,  p.  oo. 


1  I 

!  I 


[258 


259] 


OmaoUdation  of  the  Union, 


13 


pursued 
luce  coer- 

«s  of  the 
;re  boldly 
>peared  in 
ippears  to 
communi- 
rheir  sub- 
its  engage- 
litcd.     Its 
le  in  which 
they  have 
still  sover- 
lie  occasion 
n  the  most 
that  marks 
!!!onstitution 
n;  nothing 
lonwealths. 
of  a  large 
i  anew  the 
ramers,  we 
that  "  the 
iiig  neces- 

ually  been 
forever  by 
that  party 


idix,  p.  187. 
the  request  of 
il,  1839,  being 
gton  as  Prcsi- 


had  controlled  the  executive,  the  judiciary,  and  the  Senate, 
although  the  House  of  Representatives  had  on  several  occasions 
contained  an  opposition  majority.  The  accession  of  Jefferson 
to  power  was  the  death-knell  of  the  Federalist  party,  and 
from  1800  until  their  final  dissolution  they  were  an  ineffective 
and  vacillating  minority. 

The  downfall  of  the  Federalist  party  explains  in  a  great 
measure  the  security  which  the  continuance  of  the  Union 
enjoyed  during  the  two  following  decades.^  The  party  which 
represented  particularistic  and  nullifying  tendencies  was  in 
power  and  had  an  overwhelming  majority,  both  legislative 
and  popular,  behind  it.  But  although  the  possibility  of  a 
disruption  was  thus  very  small,  yet  the  essence  of  the  internal 
struggle  remained  the  same.  Indeed  its  character  was  placed 
in  a  clearer  light  by  the  facts  that  the  parts  played  by  each 
party  were  changed,  so  far  as  the  question  of  right  was  con- 
cerned, and  that  the  opposition,  in  spite  of  its  weakness,  was 
not  satisfied  with  wishes  and  threats  of  separation,  but  began 
in  earnest  to  devise  plans  of  dissolution. 

These  mutterings  were  first  heard  in  connection  with  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana  in  1803.*  The  New  England  states 
especially  opposed  its  consummation  as  affording  to  the  south- 
ern states  a  source  of  power  with  which  to  become  predom- 
inant in  the  Union  for  all  future  time ;  and  they  feared  that 
the  incorporation  of  the  western  territory  into  the  Union  and 
its  economic  development  would  prove  injurious  to  their  own 
commerce. 

These  two  elements  together  had  weight  enough  to  draw 
from  them  the  declaration  that  they  would  be  "^forced  to  a 
separation  from  the  Union.  Plumer  of  New  Hampshire 
declared  in  the  Senate :  "  Admit  this  western  world  into  the 
Union,  and  you  destroy  at  once  the  weight  and  importance  of 
the  eastern  states,  and  compel  them  to  establish  a  separate 

» Hildreth,  V.  414-418. 

» Von  Hoist,  I.  183-187 ;  Hildreth,  V.  478-481. 


I 


f!  !!    i 

[lilli 
II 1    I 


'iiti 
i:  I 


I ) 


ill  ^ 


I  ; 


\  ,  ji 
I  I'l 


14 


Tlui  I^Jffed  of  tJie  War  o/  1812  upm  the         [260 


1 1 


in<1o|H>n(1(mt  onipirc." '  And  also  Griswold  of  Conncctiout, 
the  lu^knowlcdgixl  loador  of  the  FedomlistH,  dcM^liirwl  in  the 
HouHo,  Octolier  25th,  ISO.'J:  "Tlio  viwt  unmanageable  extent 
which  the  accoKsion  of  Louisiana  will  give  to  the  United  States, 
the  consequent  dis[)orsion  of  our  population,  and  the  distri- 
bution of  the  balance  which  it  is  so  important  to  maintain 
iH'twocn  the  eastern  and  the  western  states,  threatens  at  no 
very  distant  day,  the  subversion  of  our  Union.'"  And  although 
chronologically  out  of  \)\mv,  it  will  not  l)c  amiss  to  recall  the 
s|H»och  of  Josiah  (iuinty,  delivered  in  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, January  14th,  1811,  on  the  bill  "To  enable  the  People 
of  the  Territory  of  Orleans  to  form  a  Constitution  and  state 
(iiovcrnment,  and  for  the  admission  of  such  st4ite  into  the 
Union."''  Mr.  Quincy  did  not  hold  that  a  state  had  either 
a  (,H)nstitutioual  or  a  natimil  right  to  withdraw  from  the  Union 
when  it  thought  such  a  course  best  for  it«  own  interests;  but 
he  did  maintain  that  suc^h  a  violation  of  the  fundamental 
compact  might  l)e  nuule  that  the  moral  obligation  to  maintain 
it  w^ascnl  and  the  right  of  revolution  attached.  His  words 
are :  " —  I  am  compelled  to  dwlare  it  as  my  deliberate  opinion 
that,  if  this  bill  passers,  the  Ixinds  of  this  Union  are  virtually 
diasolve<l ;  that  the  states  which  compose  it  are  free  fnmi 
their  moral  obligations :  and  that  as  it  will  l)e  the  right  of  all, 
so  it  will  be  the  duty  of  some,  to  prejMire  definitely  for  a 
separation  amicably,  if  they  can  ;  violently,  if  they  must.  .  .  . 
8uj)iH)sc,  in  private  life,  thirteen  form  a  partnership  and  ten 
of  them  uudortakc  to  admit  a  new  partner  without  the  (H)n- 
curreuw  of  the  other  thrvc,  would  it  not  l)e  at  their  option  to 
abandon  iht  partnership  after  so  palpable  infringement  of  their 
right.s?  How  much  more  in  ]H>Utical  partnership,  where  the 
admisisiou  of  new  associates,  without  previous  authority,  is  so 
pregnant  with  obvious  dangei*s  and  evils.  .  .  .     This  bill. 


'Von  Hoist.  I.  187,  note. 
*  Von  Hoist,  I.  187,  note. 
MliUlroth.  VI.  2(50. 


Mj         [260 


261] 


Consolidcd'um  of  the  Union, 


16 


[Connecticut, 
larwl  in  the 
mblc  extent 
nit<i(l  States, 
I  the  (listri- 
to  inuintuin 
(jitons  at  no 
.ndalthougli 
to  recall  the 
>f  Represen- 
e  the  People 
on  and  state 
ate  into  the 
e  had  cither 
ni  the  Union 
utcrests;  but 
fiuulaniental 
I  to  maintain 
His  words 
rate  opinion 
arc  virtually 
free  from 
right  of  all, 
Initcly  for  a 
must.  .  .  . 
lip  and  ten 
out  the  wn- 
eir  option  to 
mcnt  of  their 
where  the 
thoritv,  is  so 
This  bill, 


if  it  passes,  is  a  death-blow  to  the  Constitution.  It  may 
afterwards  linpjcr;  but  lingering,  its  fate  will,  at  no  very 
distant  |)eriod  be  con8Uinmate<l."  * 

llecoUecting  the  date  at  which  this  speech  was  delivere<l,  it 
will  l)e  noticed  that  it  is  of  very  great  imjwrtance  in  connection 
with  our  subject,  as  showing  that  just  previous  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  with  Great  Britain,  such  opinions,  marking  no  real 
consolidation  in  the  Union,  were  openly  expressed  on  the  floor 
of  the  National  Legislature. 

The  statement  not  infrequently  made,  that  at  the  time  of  the 
Louisiana  purchase  there  were  no  serious  thoughts  of  a  <lisrup- 
tion  of  the  Um'on  is  untrue.  In  the  letters  of  the  Federalists 
we  find  not  oidy  that  wishes  to  that  end  were  expressed,  but 
that  formal  plans  were  devised.  It  is  admitted  that  they  had 
no  prospe(!t  of  success ;  yet  the  fact  that  they  were  so  seriously 
di8cusse<l  is  another  link  in  the  chain  of  cumulative  evidence 
to  prove  that  the  Union,  so-cjiUed,  was  really  no  Union  at 
all.=» 

Later,  in  1806,  when  it  seemed  as  if  the  north  and  the  south 
hiul  begun  to  (jIosq  the  breach  between  them,  came  the  embargo 
question  to  tear  open  the  old  sores  and  create  new  ones.'  And 
in  this  case,  at  least,  the  opposition  acted  not  from  sentiment 
alone,  for  the  embargo  touched  the  pocrkets  of  a  great  }>art  of 
the  (country.  "  The  planters'  staple  articles,  principally  tobacco 
and  (!otton,  renuiined  unsold,  but  the  planters  themselves  suf- 
fered relatively  but  little  damage.  Their  products  woidd  keep 
and  they  were  sure  of  finding  a  market  again  as  soon  as  th(! 
harbors  were  open.  The  farmers  sold  a  considerable  portion 
of  their  products  in  the  country  itself,  but  the  rest  was  a  total 
loss.    The  productive  industry  of  the  New  England  fisliermen. 


'  An  abHtrnet  of  this  celebrated  speech  and  an  aoconnt  of  tlie  olrcimistanros 
attending  its  delivery  will  be  found  in  the  "  Life  of  Josiah  (iuinoy,"  by  IiIh 
son,  Etlinund  Qnincy,  Boston,  1807.    Pp.  205-U18. 

"Von  Hoist,  I.  198-199. 

•Vonllolst,  I.  201-217. 


!   I 


16 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  upm  the         [262 


ship-builders,  ship-owners,  importers  and  exporters,  and  all 
who  were  dependent  on  them,  ceased  almost  entirely."  * 

"  In  this  dispute  also  it  is  impossible  not  to  recognize  a 
division  of  parties  arising  from  diverse  interests  produced  by 
geographical  position,  and  every  struggle  in  which  this  played 
any  part  became  in  consequence  doubly  bitter.  The  South, 
which  held  the  balance  of  power  in  the  reigning  party  and  so 
was  primarily  responsible  for  the  embargo,  would  have  least 
to  suffer  from  it.  The  powerless  minority  of  the  New  England 
states,  the  consideration  of  whose  interests,  it  was  pretended, 
dictatal  the  measures  of  the  administration,  had  greatest  cause 
for  complaint.  The  middle  states  occupied  a  position  betokened 
by  their  name ;  their  interests  unquestionably  inclined  them 
more  toward  the  North,  but  they  wavered  from  one  side  to  the 
other."  ^  Nowhere  here  do  we  see  any  disposition  to  consult 
each  other's  interests  as  if  the  good  of  one  were  the  advantage 
of  the  whole.  No  such  advanced  idea  of  the  national  unity 
then  existed. 

The  investigation  of  the  information  bought  by  Madison 
from  the  British  spy,  Henry,'  discloses  still  further  the  fact 
that  at  this  time  secession  was  regarded  as  the  panacea  for  all 
real  or  fancied  oppressions.  Henry's  mission  confessedly  was 
to  find  out  and  report  to  his  chief.  Sir  James  Craig,  Governor 
of  Canada,  how  far  the  Federalists  would  feel  inclined  to  look 
to  England  for  support  in  case  of  a  disruption  of  the  Union. 
One  of  the  most  distinguished  sons  of  Massachusetts  was  of 
opinion  that  Henry  would  find  support  enough  for  his  opera- 
tions, if  the  Administration's  policy  was  not  changed.  As 
early  as  Noveml)er,  1808,  John  Quincy  Adams  expressed  the 
fear  that  this  might  lead  to  civil  war.  Later  he  claimed  to 
have  unequivocal  evidence  to  prove  that  there  was  a  systematic 


>Von  HoUt,  I.  209.    Cf.  Benton,  Ab.  Debates  of  Congress,  III.  692; 
IV,  64. 
*  Von  Hoist,  I.  209,  210. 
3  Von  Hoist,  I.  221,  222 ;  Hildreth,  VI.  284-287,  390. 


! 


\l'K 


I    1^ 


the         [262 

■ters,  and  all 
■ely."^ 

)  recognize  a 
produced  by 
h  this  played 
The  South, 
party  and  so 
Id  have  least 
S'ew  England 
as  pretended, 
greatest  cause 
ion  betokened 
nclined  them 
ne  side  to  the 
ion  to  consult 
the  advantage 
lational  unity 

I  by  Madison 
•ther  the  fact 
anacea  for  all 
nfessedly  was 
lig.  Governor 
3lined  to  look 
»f  the  Union, 
usetts  was  of 
for  his  opera- 

langed.  As 
expressed  the 
le  claimed  to 

a  systematic 


reas,  III.  692; 


263] 


Omsolidaiion  of  tlie  Union. 


attempt  making  to  dissolve  the  Union.  In  his  opinion  New 
England  would  have  undoubtedly  made  sure  of  the  assistance 
of  Great  Britain  if  the  Administration  had  made  civil  war 
inevitable  by  an  effort  to  overcome  the  resistance  to  the 
embargo  by  foroe  or  by  extending  it  farther.* 

In  this  hasty  glance  at  the  salient  points  in  the  history  of 
tlie  country  from  1789  to  1811,  in  so  far  as  it  bears  upon  our 
subject,  we  find  nationalization  nowhere,  decentralization  every- 
where. Secession,  so  far  from  being  regarded  as  unconstitu- 
tional or  unjustifiable  under  any  circumstances,  was  the  club 
with  which  every  minority  on  any  important  question  strove 
to  beat  the  majority  to  terms.  It  mattered  not  what  opinions 
as  to  ultimate  sovereignty  the  parties  held.  Such  considera- 
tions as  this  were  lost  sight  of  in  the  strifes  of  sectional  preju- 
dices and  the  clash  of  material  interests.  "  Judged  from  an 
impartial  standpoint,  the  fact  that  the  possibility  of  civil  war 
or  a  division  of  the  Union  were  so  frequently  and  on  relatively 
insignificant  occasions,  thought  of  on  both  sides,  may  be  fairly 
taken  as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  consolidation  which  the 
Union  had  attained  at  that  time.  The  actual  condition  of 
affairs  presented  so  unusual  a  complication  of  positive  and 
negative  factors  so  peculiarly  grouped,  that  it  was  no  easy 
matter  to  determine  their  sum  total."*  It  is  interesting  to 
read  here  the  following  words,  uttered  in  1828:^  "It  is  a 
melancholy  reflection — a  subject  that  excites  our  best  and 
inmost  feelings — that  projects  or  speculations  as  to  a  dissolu- 
tion have  been  so  frequently  indulged.  That  leading  men  in 
Virginia  looked  to  a  dismemberment  in  1798-9,  when  the 
armory  was  built ;  that  Burr  and  his  confederates  had  an  eye 
to  the  establishment  of  a  western  government  in  1806-6;  that 
many  contemplated  a  building  up  of  the  'Nation  of  New 
England'  from  1808  to  1815,  seems  to  us  undoubted;  but 


>  Von  Hoist,  I.  222,  223. 
•  Von  Hoist,  I.  220,  221. 
'See  Niles'  llegisster,  XXXV.  p.  210. 


, 


i 


I  i 


ii 


IIP 


!i 


18  The  Effed  of  (he  War  of  1812  upm  the  [264 

the  lengths  to  which  either  party  proceeded  rest  very  much  on 
conjecture  or  depend  on  opinion.  .  .  .  But  whatever  have 
been  the  designs  of  individuals,  we  have  always  believed  that 
the  vast  body  of  the  people  have  ever  been  warmly  attached  to 
the  Union."  In  view  of  our  discussion  the  last  sentiment, 
however  desirable,  certainly  seems  unwarranted,  and  at  the 
declaration  of  war  in  June  of  1812  we  have  the  spectacle  of  a 
government  composed  of  eighteen^  sovereign  integers,  each 
looking  to  its  own  interest  alone,  never  consulting  the  general 
weal,  and  claiming  the  right  and  the  duty  to  secede  from  the 
so-called  Union  whenever  such  a  course  might  seem  most 
favorable  to  its  individual  interests.  What  effect  the  war  with 
Great  Britain  was  to  have  upon  the  consolidation  of  the  Union, 
we  can  now  understandingly  inquire. 

Into  a  detailed  account  of  the  course  of  events  abroad  which 
brought  about  the  war  of  1812  we  must  not  here  enter.  But 
we  must  examine  the  causes  and  character  of  the  war  in  so  far 
as  they  have  a  direct  bearing  upon  parties  and  sections  in  the 
United  States. 

The  beginning  of  1808  saw  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  of 
Napoleon  and  the  Orders  in  Council  of  England  all  in  force,' 
and  Jefferson,  his  second  term  nearing  its  close,  at  the  helm  of 
state  in  the  United  States.  To  his  Administration  five  courses 
of  action  were  open,  some  one  of  which  must  be  adopted  as  its 
own  and  worked  out  to  its  logical  conclusion.  This  choice 
lay  between  (1)  doing  nothing  and  allowing  the  individual 
ship-owners  to  help  themselves  as  best  they  might;  or  (2) 
attempting  a  further  negotiation  with  England;  or  (3)  sus- 
pending all  commerce  with  the  outside  world ;  or  (4)  granting 


'  In  addition  to  tlie  original  thirteen  states  the  following  had  been  admit- 
ted into  the  Union  :  Vermont,  March  4th,  1791 ;  Kentucky,  June  Ist,  1792; 
Tennessee,  June  Ist,  1796 ;  Ohio,  November  29th,  1802 ;  Louisiana,  April 
8th,  1812. 

«  Hildreth,  VI.  32-35.  The  Berlin  decree  was  dated  November  21st,  1806, 
and  the  Milan  decree,  December  17th,  1807.  The  Orders  in  Council  were 
of  the  date  of  May  16th,  1806  and  November  11th,  1807,  respectively. 


ni 
bl 

a» 
h 


1'  'i 


It  I  I    :  i    '      I 
i       i 


lllll 


the         [264 


265] 


Consolidation  of  the  Union'. 


19 


very  much  on 
vhatever  have 
i  believed  that 
ily  attached  to 
ast  sentiment, 
d,  and  at  the 
!  spectacle  of  a 
integers,  each 
ng  the  general 
cede  from  the 
tit  seem  most 
it  the  war  with 
of  the  Union, 

1  abroad  which 
•e  enter.  But 
B  war  in  so  far 
ections  in  the 

ilan  decrees  of 
i  all  in  force,'' 
it  the  helm  of 
)n  five  courses 
adopted  as  its 
This  choice 
he  individual 
light  J  or  (2) 
;  or  (3)  sus- 
•  (4)  granting 

lad  been  odinit- 

Junelst,  1792; 

jouiaiana,  April 

mber2l8t,  1806, 
n  Council  were 
spectively. 


letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  to  American  ship-owners ;  or 
(5)  declaring  war  upon  England  immediately.  Of  these  pos- 
sible lines  of  policy,  entrance  upon  the  fourth  or  fifth  was 
precluded,  for  a  time  at  least,  by  a  wholesome  fear  of  the 
British  navy ;  the  first  was  shut  off  by  a  feeling  for  the 
national  honor;  the  third  was  the  choice  of  the  Administration; 
but  the  second  had  recommended  itself  as  the  most  natural 
and  as  having  precedents  iiji  the  country's  history.  Indeed  it 
had  been  tried,  resulting  in  the  treaty  which  was  agreed  upon 
in  December,  1806,  but  to  which  Jefferson  had  refused  his 
assent  without  ever  submitting  it  to  the  Senate.  This  step 
having  thus  failed,  the  Administration  had  been  free  to  pursue 
its  chosen  policy,  and  to  the  Tenth  Congress,  October  26th, 
1807,  the  President  recommended  an  embargo.*  His  recom- 
mendation was  dutifully  accepted  by  his  party  followers  in 
Congress,  and  the  embargo  became  a  law  before  the  end  of  the 
year.  The  Federalists  upon  whose  New  England  constitu- 
encies the  measure  bore  heaviest,  opposed  the  measure  both  on 
economic  and  on  constitutional  grounds,  and  their  discussion 
of  this  question  presents  us  with  what  was  destined  to  be  but 
one  of  many  mortifying  exhibitions  of  the  old  party  of  the 
Constitution.  But  on  the  constitutional  objection  it  was  over- 
matched and  was  forced  to  fall  back  to  the  vantage  ground  of 
the  economic  argument.  And  this  in  turn  was  little  heeded 
by  the  party  in  power,  so  long  as  it  did  not  come  directly  home 
to  themselves.  But  when  it  began  to  touch  their  own  pockets, 
as  it  did  a  few  months  later,  then  human  nature  proved  to  be 
too  strong  for  party  sentiment.'*  So  evident  did  this  become 
that  Nicholas,  of  Virginia,  the  Administration  leader  on  the 
floor  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  himself  introduced, 
January  25th,  1809,  a  resolution  favoring  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo  and  the  defence  of  our  maritime  rights  against  all 
belligerents.^    After  some  haggling  as  to  the  date  on  which 


>  Hildretli,  VI.  55,  56. 

»Hilclreth,  VI.  96-100. 

»  Von  Hoist,  T.  214;  Hildroth,  VI.  125-130. 


fl 


1,  ' 

•1;  1 


-f' 


,11 


!.! 


1 


i' 

ii ; 
ill 


r 


!      I 

M 
I ' 


I  ! 
I  i 
I      , 


20 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  upm  the         [266 


the  Embargo  Act  should  expire,  March  15th,  1809,  was  agreed 
upon  as  a  compromise  and  the  resohitions  were  passed.  This 
virtually  threw  the  United  States  back  to  the  position  in  which 
it  was  when  confronted  by  five  possible  courses  of  action,  while 
two  of  the  five, — those  by  further  negotiation  and  cutting  off 
all  intercourse  with  the  outside  world — proved  useless  by  the 
failure  of  the  treaty  and  of  the  embargo.  The  prospect  of  an 
amicable  solution  of  the  difficulty  by  a  further  treaty  was  poor 
indeed,  if  we  consider  the  spirit  of  the  British  Government  and 
the  hostility  of  the  llepublican  j)arty  to  everything  British. 
In  Great  Britain  Mr.  Fox  was  dead  and  a  new  Administration 
had  come  into  power  strongly  retrograde  in  policy  and  having 
George  Canning  for  its  soul.  Great  Britain  was  determined 
to  recover  her  commerce  and  to  take  back  her  seamen,  and  the 
United  States  had  no  alternative  but  to  submit  or  fight.  The 
resumption  of  commerce  and  its  defence,  referred  to  in  the 
Nicholas  resolutions,  must  then  be  bv  war. 

The  Eleventh  Congress  at  its  first  session  voted  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  non-intercourse  Act  with  Great  Britain,  and 
then  two  years  passed  during  which  the  latter  continued  the 
execution  of  her  offensive  orders  and  decrees  against  neutral 
commerce.  But  when  the  Twelfth  Congress  assembled  in 
November,  1811,  it  was  felt  that  some  decisive  action  would 
soon  be  taken.*  The  leadership  of  the  dominant  party  had 
been  assumed  by  younger  and  more  impetuous  men ;  and 
with  Clay  as  Speaker  of  the  House,  Calhoun  standing  second 
on  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Crawford  and 
Grundy  acting  with  them,  war  was  certain  within  the  year.^ 

The  move  was  quick  and  emphatic.  On  November  29th 
Calhoun's  committee  reportal  a  resolution  declaring  "  For- 
bearance has  ceased  to  be  a  virtue.  .  .  .  The  period  has 
arrived  when  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee  it  is  the  sacreil 


•  For  the  personal  and  party  constitution  of  the  Twelftli  Congress,  see 
llildretli,  VI.  259,  t2G0. 
•■'Von  Hoist,  I.  i22G. 


dl 
til 
til 


mniii: 


!  iiiili 

, ,  iilil' 

IJ    !     '■       III!:! 

Ill  i! life 


m  the 


[266 


809,  was  agreed 
e  ]>assed.  Tina 
»osition  in  which 
of  action,  wliile 
and  cutting  off 
d  useless  by  the 
Ej  prospect  of  an 
treaty  was  poor 
jovernment  and 
•ything  British. 
Administration 
►licy  and  having 
was  determined 
seamen,  and  the 
t  or  fight.  The 
erred  to  in  the 

voted  the  con- 

at  Britain,  and 

r  continued  the 

against  neutral 

IS  assembled  in 

e  action  would 

ant  party  had 

ous  men ;  and 

tanding  second 

Crawford  and 

thin  the  year.'^ 

ovember  29th 


khvri 


mg 


(( 


For- 


pie  period  has 
lit  is  the  sacred 


Iftli  Congress,  see 


\ 


267] 


Conaolidation  of  the  Union. 


21 


duty  of  Congress  to  call  forth  the  resources  and  patriotism  of 
the  country."'  In  addition  the  committee  recommended  that 
the  standing  army  be  increased  by  10,000  men  and  that  the 
President  be  authorized  to  call  50,000  volunteers  under  arms. 
This  was  all  acceded  to  without  any  delay  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority. 

But  such  resolutions  were  inoperative  without  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  President,  and  he  was  for  peace.  Fortune,  how- 
ever, favored  the  war  jiarty.  A  presidential  election  would 
take  place  in  the  following  autumn  and  Madison  was  anxious 
for  a  second  term.  In  this  the  leaders  of  the  war  faction  saw 
their  opportunity.  They  waited  upon  Madison  and  plainly 
told  him  that  the  condition  sine  qud  non  of  their  support  in 
the  coming  campaign  was  his  acceptance  of  their  war  policy. 
Madison  knew  very  well  that  both  Monroe  and  Gerry  were 
ready  and  willing  to  accept  the  presidential  nomination  on  a 
war  platform.  This  determined  his  action,  and  he  gave  in 
his  adherence  to  the  war  party.* 

On  April  3rd  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  that  the  action  of  the 
British  government  in  refusing  to  repeal  the  Orders  in  Council 
had  left  the  United  States  no  option  but  to  prepare  for  war,  and 
that  an  embargo  of  sixty  days  duration  had  been  recommended.' 
This  recommendation  had  already  been  sent  in  on  April  let.  It 
was  acted  upon  by  Congress,  but  the  war  party  could  not  wait. 
They  drove  Madison  on,  and  on  June  1st  he  sent  in  his  mes- 
sage recommending  a  declaration  of  war.*  Two  days  after- 
ward Calhoun  reported  on  it  from  his  committee,  and  the 
declaration  was  carried  in  the  House  by  a  vote  of  79  to  49. 
The  Senate  was  more  deliberate,  and  after  two  weeks'  delay  it 
passed  the  declaration,  June  17th,  by  a  vote  of  17  to  13. 

An  analysis  of  this  vote  is  interesting  as  showing  the  sec- 
tional character  of  the  war  party  and  of  the  opposition  to  it. 


>  Von  Hoist,  I.  22f)-227  ;  IliUli-etli,  VI.  2()2-2f.5. 
«  Von  Ilolbt,  I.  230-232;  Hildreth,  VI.  289-291. 
'  Hildreth,  VI,  291-294. 
*  Von  Hoist,  I.  232,  233 ;  Hildreth,  VI.  303-300. 


-.  I 


i   :i. 


\\\' 


liihi 


'  li'iM  ; 


22 


The  J§ect  of  the  War  o/  1812  upm  the         [268 


Louisinnn,  nmkinjiif  the  oijj;htcenth  state,  had  Just  IxK^n  admitted, 
and  tlio  House  contained  177  meml)er8  apiK)rtioned  in  tlic  ratio 
of  one  to  every  thirty-tive  thousand  inliabitants.  There  were 
8G  nicmhers  of  the  Senate,  thus  making  a  total  of  213  in  lM)tli 
liouses,  not  inchiding  the  Vice-President  who  was  presiding 
in  the  Senate.  The  New  York  delegation  of  27  was  then  for 
the  first  time  more  numerous  than  that  of  every  other  state. 
Pennsylvania  was  second  with  23  memlwrs,  and  Virginia 
third  with  22.  The  meml)ers  from  New  Hampshire,  most 
of  those  from  Massachusetts  (which  then  included  what  is 
now  the  state  of  Maine),  those  from  C'Onnecticut,  Rhode 
Island,  New  Jersey  and  Delaware,  with  several  from  New 
York,  some  from  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  one  from 
IVnnsylvania  and  three  from  Maryland,  opposed  the  war. 
The  members  from  Vermont,  some  from  New  York,  all  but 
one  from  Pennsylvania,  most  of  them  from  Maryland,  Vir- 
ginia and  North  Carolina,  all  from  South  Carolina,  Georgia, 
Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Ohio,  and  Louisiana,  supporte<l  it. 
New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  New  York, 
and  Di>laware  were  represented  by  senators  who  nposed 
the  war.  IMassachusctts  and  Maryland  were  divided,  while 
Vermont,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina,  Geoi'gia,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Ohio,  and  I^ouisi- 
ana  were  represented  by  senators  who  supporto;'  the  war. 
Of  the  large  sea-board  cities,  Boston  and  New  York  were 
represented  by  members  found  in  the  minority.  The  dele- 
gations from  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  and  New 
Orlejins  were  with  the  majori*^y.  The  ctvstern  states  as  a 
rule  opposeil  the  war;  the  western  states  were  all  for  it, 
with  the  southern  and  middle  states  divided.  The  practical 
feature  was  that  the  war  administration  could  (•omnuuid  a 
inajority  of  nearly  forty  votes  in  the  House  and  one  of  four 
or  five  votes  in  the  Senate. 

Taking  the  reasoning  portion  of  the  community  as  the  judge, 
probably  the  declaration  of  war  was  mostly  condemned;  but  the 
instinctive  patriotism  of  the  young  men  of  the  country  enthusias- 


n  the 


[268 


269] 


Consolidation  of  the  Union. 


23 


k  Ix-'cn  admitted, 
)neil  in  the  i-utio 
s.     There  were 
of  2 13  ill  lK)th 
•  was  presiding 
17  was  then  for 
cry  other  state, 
and  Virginia 
impshirc,  most 
'hided  what  is 
ecticnt,  Rhode 
;ral  from  New 
lina,  one  from 
)0sed  the  war. 
York,  all  hut 
laryland,  Vir- 
olina,  Georgia, 
supported   it. 
,  New  York, 
who     pposed 
ivided,  while 
irolina.   South 
and  Louisi- 
rto;'  the  war. 
York  were 
The  dele- 
on,  and  New 
states  as  a 
0  all  for  it, 
The  practical 
command  a 
one  of  four 

as  the  judge, 
nned;  but  the 
trv  enthusias- 


rV 


tioally  maintaineil  it.  Few  denied  that  sufficient  muse  for  the 
war  existetl,  but  the  time  and  mode  of  its  declaration  were  con- 
demned. Defensive  though  the  war  appeared  to  be,  yet  it  was 
offensive  in  that  it  was  voluntarily  undertaken  by  the  United 
States  to  compel  Great  Britain  by  the  invasion  and  conquest 
of  her  North  American  dependencies,  to  respect  our  maritime 
rights  as  neutrals. 

A  united  sentiment  on  the  part  of  the  people,  more  esiie- 
cially  those  from  whom  men  and  money  must  principally  be 
drawn,  would  have  excused  in  a  great  measure  the  haste  and 
lack  of  preparation  with  which  the  war  had  been  declared 
and  would  soon  have  filled  up  the  ranks  of  the  army  and 
the  coffers  of  the  treasury.  But  any  such  unanimity  was 
entirely  wanting.  The  policy  of  the  old  Republicans,  with 
the  exception  of  the  small  class  of  Francomaniacs,  as  well  as 
of  the  Federalists,  had  been  alike  neutrality  and  jicace.  But 
however  peaceful  might  have  been  the  intentions  of  Jeffei'son 
and  his  close  followers,  there  had  always  been  a  faction,  more 
or  less  large,  which  was  determined  to  bring  about  a  war  with 
Great  Britjiin.  This  faction  had  scrvetl  as  the  nuMeus  about 
which  variou8,forces  and  tendencies  had  caused  the  now  trium- 
phant war  party  to  crystallize. 

But  that  the  war  wjis  a  })arty  one  was  too  evident  to  l)e 
denied  even  by  its  warmest  advocates.  In  the  first  place  we 
have  the  important  address  to  their  constituents  by  thirty- 
four  membei*s  of  the  minority  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tivcs.'  This  address  hold,  in  substance,  that  the  United 
States  was  a  nation  (sic)  composed  of  eighteen  independent 
sovereignties  united  by  a  moral  obligation  only.  It  went  on 
to  say :  "  —  above  all,  it  apj)eared  to  the  undersigned  from 
signs  not  to  be  mistaken,  that  if  we  entered  upon  this  war, 
wo  did  it  as  a  divided  people ;  not  only  from  a  sense  of  the 
inadequacy  of  our  means  to  success,  but  from  moral  and 
political  objections  of  groat  weight  and  very  general  infiu- 
enco."     Those  "  nu)ral  and  political  objections "  were  con- 


i  Niles'  Register,  11.  309-315. 


il:i 


M  :■ 


i-  ' 


24 


The  Effect  of  ihe  War  of  1812  upon  the  [270 


sidered  by  the  authors  of  the  address  to  have  the  greatest 
weight,  and  to  their  words  the  next  presidential  election  gave 
a  peculiar  emphasis.  The  war  was  the  live  issue  of  the  cam- 
paign and  the  result  showed  more  plainly  than  had  been  done 
in  many  years  before,  the  geographical  separation  of  parties. 
All  the  New  England  states  excepting  Vermont,  together 
with  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Delaware  cast  their  elec- 
toral vote  solidly  for  De  Witt  Clinton.  Maryland  was 
divided,  while  Pennsylvania  and  all  the  southern  and  mcs- 
tern  states  voted  unanimously  for  Madison.^  Aside  from 
what  such  a  separation  as  this  too  plainly  indicates,  the 
proof  that  the  war  was  a  sectional  one  is  cumulative.  Six 
months  before  the  declaration  was  made,  Macon  of  North 
Carolina,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  war  party, 
said :  "  And  here,  sir,  permit  me  to  say  that  I  hope  this  is 
to  be  no  partv  war,  but  a  national  war.  .  .  .  Such  a  war, 
if  war  wo  shall  have,  can  alone,  in  my  judgment,  obtain  the 
end  for  which  we  mean  to  contend,  without  any  disgrace."^ 
And  two  years  later  Webster  in  his  forcible  rhetoric  declared  : 
"  The  truth  is,  sir,  that  party  support  is  not  the  kind  of  sup- 
port necessary  to  sustain  the  country  through  a  long,  expen- 
sive, and  bloody  contest ;  and  this  should  have  been  considered 
before  the  war  was  declared.  The  cause,  to  be  successful,  must 
be  upheld  by  other  sentiments  and  higher  motives.  It  must 
draw  to  itself  the  sober  approbation  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
people.  It  must  enlist,  not  their  temporary  or  party  feelings, 
but  their  steady  patriotism  and  their  constant  zeal.  Unlike 
the  old  nations  of  Eurojie,  there  are  in  this  country  no  dregs 
of  population  fit  only  to  supply  the  constant  waste  of  war  and 
out  of  which  an  army  can  be  raised  for  hire  at  any  tini('  and 
for  any  pnrpose.  Armies  of  any  magnitude  can  be  here  noth- 
ing but  the  ])eo]ile  embodied  ;  and  if  the  object  be  one  for  which 
the  people  will  not  embody  there  can  be  no  armies."'^ 


'  Noted  by  \'i>n  Hoist,  I.  'JM<1. 

"  Benton,  Ab.  l>ebiites  of  ( Joiigress,  IV.  4")'2. 

"Benton,  Ab.  Debates  of  Congress,  V.  l.'W. 


; 


P 

w 
le 
ci 


oi 


a  the 


[270 


271] 


OmsoUdaiion  of  the  Union. 


25 


ve  the  greatest 
il  election  gave 
>ue  of  the  caiu- 
had  been  done 
tion  of  parties, 
mont,  together 
jast  their  elec- 
Maryland  was 
(lern  and  Aves- 
'     Aside  from 

indicates,  the 
iiulative.  Six 
icon  of  North 
he  war  party, 
I  hope  this  is 

Such  a  war, 
ent,  obtain  the 
my  disgrace."" 
orie  leclared  : 
i  kind  of  sup- 
1  long,  expen- 
een  considered 
iccessful,  must 

es.  It  must 
it  mass  of  the 

arty  feelings, 
!cal.  Unlike 
ntry  no  dregs 
te  of  war  and 
any  time;  and 
be  here  noth- 
one  for  which 
nies.""'' 


i 


But  previously,  in  his  celebrated  Fourth  of  July  oration  at 
Portsmouth,  in  1812,^  Webster  had  taken  the  ground  that  the 
war  was  unjustifiable  in  political  economy,  but  that  it  was  now 
legally  declared  and  had  become  the  law  of  the  land,  and  all 
citizens,  including  those  of  New  England,  although  they  saw 
that  their  personal  interests  had  been  disregarded,  should  pay 
their  share  of  the  expenses  and  render  personal  service  to  the 
full  and  just  extent  of  their  constitutional  liability.  Here  the 
old  question  again  arose.  Who  is  to  decide  what  that  consti- 
tutional liability  includes?  And  here  again  is  seen  the  absurd 
and  disgraceful  position  of  the  once-honored  Federalists.  All 
of  the  New  England  legislatures,  excepting  that  of  Vermont, 
as  well  as  that  of  New  Jersey,  planted  themselves  upon  the 
ground  marked  out  for  them  by  Webster,  with  the  further 
and,  in  the  light  of  the  past  history  of  the  men  engaged 
in  the  movement,  ludicrously  extreme  position  taken  by  the 
Su{)reme  Court  of  Massachusetts  and  the  military  commander 
of  Rhode  Island.  The  outgrowth  of  this  doctrine  was  the 
refusal  of  militia  aid  by  New  England  and,  a  little  later,  the 
Hartford  Convention." 

Upon  the  history  and  work  of  the  Hartford  Convention  we 
need  not  dwell  longer  than  to  recall  the  fact  that  the  states  in 
sending  delegates  to  the  Convention  were  committing  an  extra- 
constitutional  and,  to  say  the  least,  highly  unnational  act,  that 
their  rej)ort  read  like  a  revised  edition  of  Madison's  Virginia 
llesolutions,  that  they  urged  specific  constitutional  amend- 
ments, some  of  which — notably  tho?o  calling  for  the  prohibi- 
tion of  commercial  intercourse,  the  admission  of  new  states, 
and  the  declaration  of  war  by  a  two-thirds  majority  only  of 
both  houses  of  Congress — sound  strangely  like  process  under 
the  old  Confederation  regime,  1781-7.     As  showing  the  anti- 


■  Curtis,  I/ift'  of  Daniel  Webster,  I.  105.  Cf.  Welister's  Spcecli  in  the 
IIotiHo  of  Keprcseiitativcs,  Jniiiiiiry  lltii,  1814,  IJeriton,  Ab.  Debutes  of  Con- 
gre<s,  v.  l.'iS. 

«  Vnu  Hoist,  1.  L'(!0-'J7'J;  llildrelh,  VI.  472,  473,  532-535,  545-553.  Cf. 
Dwiglit,  History  of  tUu  Iliutfunl  Convention. 


111! 


,:  i 


i  ! 


I  ' 


I   II!!  i 


I:- 
liil- 


ill 


\'' 


;i!t  i!'!' 


'  '/mi 

I      Hi    '■: 


26 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  upm  the         [272 


national  tendencies  prevalent  at  the  time,  the  report  of  the 
Hartford  Convention  is  of  interest  to  us.  But  the  almost 
immediate  conclusion  of  peace  put  an  end  to  any  attempts 
to  carry  out  its  suggestions. 

With  the  conclusion  of  the  war  came  a  calm,  and  in  its 
quiet  we  are  able  to  discern  what  were  the  effects  of  the  con- 
flict upon  the  great  internal  question  in  the  United  States. 

Looking  back  from  our  standpoint  of  the  present  we  can 
easily  conclude  that  as  a  matter  of  right  the  war  was  certainly 
fully  justified,  but  as  an  economic  policy  its  expediency  must 
be  questioned.  It  had  lasted  two  and  one-half  years  and 
raised  the  national  debt  from  $45,000,000  to  $127,000,000, 
or  at  the  rate  of  somewhat  more  than  $30,000,000  a  year. 
Yet  its  political  effect  was  cheaply  bought  even  at  that  price. 
Although  not  destined  to  be  permanent,  the  n.itional  feeling  it 
produced  was  something  entirely  novel,  but  none  the  less 
excellent. 

From  1800  to  1815  the  old  national  party,  the  Federalists, 
driven  by  the  necessities  of  opposition  and  selfishness,  gravi- 
tated over  to  the  particularistic  doctrine,  but  lost  weight  at 
each  step,  until  finally,  like  a  candle  burned  to  its  socket,  they 
flickered  faintly  in  the  Hartford  Convention  and  then  went 
out  forever.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Republicans,  led  by  the 
possession  of  power  and,  it  were  charitable  to  suppose,  a  more 
enlightened  intelligence,  grew  stronger  day  by  day  as  they 
gave  up,  in  practice  at  least,  their  old  particularistic  and  strict 
construction  theories  for  a  more  broadly  national  platform. 
That  the  sentiment  of  the  people  at  large  had  correspondingly 
changed  is  shown  by  the  next  presidential  election.  When 
the  votes  of  the  election  for  the  eighth  presidential  term  were 
ctmnted,  it  was  found  *luit  only  84  out  of  '217  had  been  (!ast 
for  Federalist  candidates.  Even  Rluxle  Island  now  severed 
her  connection  with  her  old  friends,  Massachusetts  and  Con- 
necticut, although  Delaware  now  joined  them.  How  demoral- 
ized the  Federalist  party  had  beeonie  apj)ears  still  more  clearly 
when  we  soe  how  their  votes  for  Vice-President  were  scattered. 


ol 


a1 
ai 

SI 


1  iiii.i 


ii.;!iiiu_ 


yn  the 


[272 


273] 


Consolidation  of  the  Union, 


27 


le  report  of  the 
But  the  almost 
;o  any  attempts 

aim,  and  in  its 
jcts  of  the  con- 
lited  States, 
present  we  can 
ir  was  certainly 
spediency  must 
lialf  years  and 

$127,000,000, 
00,000  a  year. 
I  at  that  price, 
ional  feeling  it 

none  the  less 

he  Federalists, 

Sshness,  gravi- 

ost  weight  at 

ts  socket,  they 

lid  then  went 

lis,  led  by  the 

ppose,  a  more 

day  as  they 

itic  and  strict 

iial  platform. 

'respond  ingly 

tion.     When 

al  term  were 

ad  been  (ust 

now  severed 

ts  and  Con- 

o\v  demoral- 

luoro  clearly 

re  scattered. 


Massachusetts  voted  solidly  for  John  Eager  Howard  of  Mary- 
land, Delaware  did  the  same  for  Robert  G.  Harper  of 
Maryland,  while  Connecticut  gave  five  votes  to  James  Ross 
of  Pennsylvania  and  four  to  John  Marshall  of  Virginia. 
These  three  states  alone  cast  any  electoral  votes  against  the 
Republican  candidates.  The  Republicans  now,  for  the  instant 
at  any  rate,  a  national  party,  remained  mastei-s  of  the  field 
and  until  circumstances  should  develop  new  party  issues  their 
supremacy  was  assured. 

Strangely  enough  sound  the  testimonies  to  the  unifying 
influence  of  the  war  given  by  men  who  belonged  to  the  same 
party  that  Jefferson  had  once  led.  And  we  know  of  no 
better  way  to  show  this  effect  of  the  war  than  by  a  few  selec- 
tions from  the  political  correspondence  of  the  leading  men  of 
the  period. 

Almost  with  a  voice  of  prophecy  Gallatin  had  written  to 
Nicholson,  July  17th,  1807,  in  regard  to  the  war  which  was 
even  then  looked  forward  to :  "  In  fact  the  greatest  mischiefs 
which  I  apprehend  from  the  war  are  the  necessary  increase  of 
executive  power  and  influence  .  .  .  and  the  introduction  of 
permanent  military  and  naval  establishments,"*  both  of  which 
we  know  to  be  the  concomitants  of  a  perfect  nation. 

September  6th,  1815,  Gallatin  writes  to  Jefferson,  then  in 
retirement  at  Monticello :  "  The  war  has  been  useful.  The 
character  of  America  stands  now  as  high  as  ever  on  the  Euro- 
pean continent  and  higher  than  it  ever  did  in  Great  Britain. 
I  may  say  that  we  are  favorites  everywhere  except  at  courts, 
and  even  there  we  are  personally  respected  and  considered  as 
tiie  nation  designed  to  check  the  naval  despotism  of  Eng- 
land.'"' 

Again  he  writes  to  Jefferson,  under  the  date  of  November 
27th,  1815:  "Tlic  war  has  been  successfully  and  honoral)ly 
terminated;  a  debt  of  no  more  than  eighty  millions  incurred, 
Louisiana  paid  for,  and  an  incipient  navy  created  ;  our  popu- 


•  Honry  Ailauis,  Tlio  Writings  of  Alltort  (iiiUiitin,  I.  339. 

*  AduiiiH,  WriliiigM  of  Albert  Gullalin,  I.  051,  Co2. 


•liill 


li 


I  : 


lli 


I 'II 

hi'', 


il^l!! 


Mil' 


!■'''■ 

libit 


If 

II   hh  I 
1 1  mil 


± 


I  • 


28 


TJie  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812  upm  the  [274 


lation  increased  in  the  same  and  our  resources  in  a  much 
greater  proportion ;  our  revenue  greater  than  ever." ' 

Gallatin  says  to  Matthew  Lyon/  May  7th,  1816:  "The 
war  has  been  productive  of  evil  and  good,  but  I  think  the 
good  preponderates.  Independent  of  the  loss  of  lives  and  of 
the  losses  in  property  by  individuals,  the  war  has  laid  the 
foundation  of  permanent  taxes  and  military  establishments 
which  the  Republicans  had  deemed  unfavorable  to  the  happi- 
ness and  free  institutions  of  the  country.  But  under  our 
former  system  we  were  becoming  too  selfish,  too  much  attached 
exclusively  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  above  all,  too  much 
confined  in  our  political  feelings  to  local  and  State  objects. 
The  war  has  renewed  and  reinstated  the  national  feelings 
and  character  which  the  Revolution  had  given  and  which 
were  daily  lessened.  The  people  have  now  more  general 
objects  of  attachment  with  which  their  pride  and  political 
opinions  are  connected.  They  are  more  Americans  ;  they  feel 
and  act  more  as  a  nation,  and  I  hope  that  the  permanency  of 
the  Union  is  thereby  better  secured." ' 

And  twenty  years  later,  when  the  smoke  of  the  old  battle 
had  cleared  away  and  another  conflict,  this  time  one  of  prin- 
ciples, was  waging,  Gallatin  writes  to  Edward  Everett,  Janu- 
ary, 1835:  "I  do  insist  on  the  undeniable  fact  that  the 
national  character  has  been  entirely  redeemed  by  the  late  war, 
and  that  at  this  time  no  country  is  held  by  foreign  nations  and 
governments  in  higher  respect  and  consideration  than  the 
United  States."  * 


*  Adams,  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin,  I.  607. 

*  Matthew  Lyon  represented  a  Vermont  district  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives from  1797  to  1801,  and  a  Kentucky  district  from  1803  to  1811. 
For  some  of  the  incidents  of  his  sensational  political  career,  see  Illldreth, 
V.  80,  187-191,  247-'2o0,  295;  VI.  2.38,  239;  and  also  McMaster,  A  History 
of  the  People  of  the  United  States  from  the  Revolution  to  tlie  Civil  War. 
New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Company,  1885.  Vol.  II.  pp.  327-329,  356,  363- 
307,  399-402,  430,  532. 

"  Adams,  Writings  of  Albert  (iallatin,  I.  700. 

*  Adams,  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin,  11.  500. 


27 


to 

spc 

bee 

elej 

bas 


1  the 


[274 


275] 


Consolidaiion  of  the  Union. 


29 


Jes  in  a  much 

,  1816:  "The 
it  I  think  the 
af  lives  and  of 
r  has  laid  the 
establishments 
e  to  the  happi- 
>ut  under  our 
much  attached 
all,  too  much 
State  objects, 
ional  feelings 
!n  and  which 
more  general 
and  political 
ins ;  they  feel 
ermanency  of 

he  old  battle 
one  of  prin- 

Iverett,  Janu- 

act  that  the 

the  late  war, 

nations  and 

on  than  the 


Jeiferson  writes  to  Gallatin,  May  18th,  1816,  in  reference 
to  the  lack  of  political  dissension  in  Virginia,  and  says :  "  This 
spontaneous  and  universal  concurrence  of  sentiment  has  not 
been  artificially  produced.  I  consider  this  as  presenting  an 
element  of  character  in  our  people  which  must  constitute  the 
basis  of  every  estimate  of  the  solidity  and  duration  of  our 
government."  ^  Strange  words  these  to  come  from  the  pen 
which  drew  up  the  Kentucky  resolutions ! 

Crawford,  in  a  letter  to  Gallatin,  bearing  the  date  of  Octo- 
ber 27th,  1817,  writes:  "The  President's  tour  through  the 
East  has  produced  something  like  a  political  jubilee.  They 
were  in  the  land  of  steady  habits,  at  least  for  the  lime,  *  all 
Federalists,  all  Republicans.'  A  general  absolution  of  politi- 
cal sins  seems  to  have  been  mutually  agreed  upon."  ^ 

The  war  had  ruined  the  particularists ;  it  had  made  all 
nationalists,  if  we  may  use  the  word.  The  bonds  of  the  early 
days  of  the  revolution  were  forged  anew  and  the  nation's  heart 
beat  as  one.  Patriotism  and  national  pride  had  conquered 
sectionalism  and  personal  selfishness.  The  era  of  good  feeling 
had  dawned.^  But  it  was  the  ominous  calm  that  precedes  the 
tempest. 

With  this  position  gained  and  all  foreign  entanglements  re- 
moved by  Waterloo  and  its  consequences,  the  United  States 
was  thrown  back  on  itself  and  the  fire  of  slavery  which  had 
l)cen  smoldering  in  its  bosom  now  found  an  opportunity  to 
burst  forth  afresh  and  kindle  the  conflagration  from  which 


buse  of  Repre- 
1803  to  1811. 
,  see  IlihJreth, 
iter,  A  History 
tlie  Civil  Wnr. 
-32!),  350,  303- 


'  Adams,  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin,  I.  705. 

*  Adams,  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin,  II.  65 ;  Ilildreth,  VI.  G23. 

^ Owing  to  the  fact  that  this  essay  was  written  before  the  excellent  His- 
tory of  the  United  States  of  America  under  the  Constitution,  by  James 
Sciiouler,  Washington,  1886,  was  published,  no  references  to  that  work  are 
made.  Volumes  1.  and  II.  of  Mr.  Schouler's  History,  embracing  the  period 
discussed  in  this  monograpli,  are  particularly  important  for  the  proper 
understanding  of  the  influences  at  work  in  it.  In  Vol.  II.  452-454,  it  is 
gratifying  to  iind  the  author  taking  the  view  of  the  cH'ect  of  the  War  of 
1812  that  is  developed  in  this  essay. 


Il!< 


iliii 


30 


The  Effect  of  the  War  of  1812. 


[276 


the  camp-fires  of  the  great  civil  war  forty  years  later  were 
to  be  lighted. 

But  because  the  good  effect  of  the  second  war  with  Great 
Britain  was  soon  swept  away  by  the  slavery  dispute,  we  must 
not  overlook  the  fact  that  such  an  effect  existed.  The  country 
entered  the  war  distracted,  indifferent,  and  particularistic ;  it 
emerged  from  it  united,  enthusiastic,  and  national.  But  the 
ebb  was  to  be  greater  than  the  flow,  and  half  a  century  was  to 
elapse  before  the  conditions  of  national  unity  which  existed  in 
the  years  immediately  following  the  war  of  1812  were  again 
to  be  plainly  observed  in  our  political  history. 


i  r: 


''J 


I 


[276 

ra  later  were 

r  with  Great 
ute,  we  must 
The  country 
cularistic;  it 
al.  But  the 
ntury  was  to 
ch  existed  in 
I  were  again 


